Tsintsadze in Strasbourg – Georgia exports its judicial clan to Europe

According to Articles 3 and 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, the defense of judicial independence is a central principle of the organization. The Magna Carta of Judges also states unequivocally: "The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental element for the maintenance of the rule of law." And yet, when it comes to the composition of its own bodies, the Council of Europe is apparently failing precisely where it should be most credible.

The most recent example: the appointment of Georgian judge Ketevan Tsintsadze to the working group of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE). Tiflis24 inquired with the Council of Europe – and received a remarkably evasive response.

"The appointment of each member of the CCJE shall be made by the competent authorities of the respective member state in accordance with Rule 5 of Resolution CM/Res(2021)3." — Tatiana Baeva-Frachon, Spokesperson of the Council of Europe, 16 June 2025 [Source: Official response to Tbilisi24, published with consent]

What at first glance sounds like a bureaucratic hint is in reality a political capitulation: the composition of the body is left entirely to the respective governments – even if these are governments whose judicial systems are suspected of corruption.

Tsintsadze: Career in the shadow of the judicial clan

The Tsintsadze case is not an isolated incident, but a prime example of the intertwining of power and loyalty in the Georgian judicial system:

• According to Transparency International Georgia (2019), Tsintsadze worked for years as an assistant to the controversial judge Mikheil Chinchaladze , a key figure in the so-called “judicial clan”.

• In her role as “Independent Inspector” of the judiciary, she refrained for years from investigating judges close to the Klan – even when there were clear grounds for suspicion, according to several NGO reports.

• Democracy Index Georgia writes that the position of inspector was "systematically awarded to clan-loyal individuals." Tsintsadze is cited as an example.

• In April 2023, the US imposed sanctions on Chinchaladze and other judges for “significant corruption.”

• Despite this (or perhaps because of this?), Tsintsadze was appointed a judge for life in 2024 – with the support of those very structures.

  
  

And what is the Council of Europe doing?

The CCJE refers to Rule 5 of Resolution CM/Res(2021)3 , which states:

“The committees shall consist of a person appointed by the respective government with the highest possible qualification in the relevant field.”

In other words, the Council of Europe assumes no responsibility for the quality or integrity of its nominees. Nor does it examine whether the nominees comply with its own Magna Carta of Judges , which cites judicial independence and personal integrity as key criteria. [Source: https://rm.coe.int/16807482de ]

A request from Tiflis24 as to whether any form of due diligence or integrity check is conducted was met with silence. The same was true of the question as to whether proximity to US-sanctioned individuals is an exclusion criterion for advisory activities in Council of Europe bodies.

Articles 3 & 8: Shells or duty to act?

A look at the statutes of the Council of Europe highlights the contradiction between claim and reality:

• Article 3 : “Each Member undertakes to respect the principles of the rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

• Article 8 : “In the event of a serious breach of these principles, a member may be suspended or expelled.” [Source: https://rm.coe.int/1680306052 ]

However, if judicial independence is so crucial, why are there no mechanisms to review or revise problematic nominations?

Systematic double standards?

The Council of Europe expects Georgia to implement judicial reforms that combat precisely those structures it accepts internally without comment. Brussels demands vetting, but the Council of Europe approves. The CCJE is not a purely symbolic body – its opinions influence legal developments throughout Europe.

"Precisely because the legitimacy of the CCJE rests on the independence of its members, it is worrying that a representative was nominated who is considered both domestically and internationally to be part of the judicial clan." — Goga Machavariani, Tbilisi24 (from the official inquiry to the Council of Europe)

Credibility crisis made in Strasbourg

Whether out of political calculation or structural convenience, the Council of Europe is ignoring a fundamental principle of good governance – not only demanding judicial independence, but also practicing it. The institution that, along with the Strasbourg Court, was once considered a bulwark against authoritarian structures, is thus becoming a toothless observer.

If a body like the CCJE does not even check whether its members are acting in accordance with the rule of law in their own country, it loses all moral authority – vis-à-vis Georgia, vis-à-vis the EU, and vis-à-vis citizens who hope for justice.

The Council of Europe can no longer hide behind formal rules if it wants to remain credible. The principles of Article 3, Article 8, and the Magna Carta of Judges apply not only to candidate countries like Georgia, but also to the institutions themselves. Binding vetting is finally needed, including within the Council of Europe.

Because: Anyone who declares themselves a guardian of the rule of law must not become an accomplice of authoritarian networks.